Toxic partners<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite the promise of millions of rands in fees, no one wanted the job of transaction advisor to PetroSA. At least not on these deals, which involved the sanctioned Russian bank Gazprombank and its technical partner Ural Himmash.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This nugget of information was revealed by an unnamed member of the management team who told Internal Audit that \u201cMazars was the only party on PetroSA\u2019s panel that responded to the request for advisory services. Others declined on the basis of Russian links to the respondents of the RFPs and the subsequent US sanctions on certain Russian entities.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n But Mazars \u2013 which stood to earn at least R15-million in fees \u2013 accepted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The job was to marshal financial, technical and legal advice on three proposed deals:<\/p>\n\n\n\n When we first approached Mazars last year, director Rishi Juta was keen to distance his firm from the deals. \u201cFor the sake of clarity, I can confirm that Mazars did not advise PetroSA prior to its appointment of the preferred partners in terms of [the Equator deal],\u201d he told us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While technically true \u2013 the bid evaluation committee had scored the tenders and selected the preferred bidders \u2013 the board would not approve the deals without Mazars\u2019 due diligence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fact that no one, aside from Mazars, was willing to work with PetroSA\u2019s preferred bidders should have been an immediate warning sign. The problem was that PetroSA seemed more interested in green lights than red flags.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As part of the EquaTheza deal, for instance, Mulaudzi and his partners had agreed to pay $12-million (R227-million) to PetroSA as soon as the deal was signed, as their contribution towards the upkeep of the rapidly deteriorating offshore FA platform.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe Acting COO [Sesakho Magadla] at the time was under pressure to conclude the [tender] with the partners because of the much needed $12 million to support PetroSA\u2019s liquidity position,\u201d an unnamed member of the management team told Internal Audit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Adding to the pressure, EquaTheza allegedly told PetroSA that if it didn\u2019t sign soon, the funds would be diverted elsewhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cEquatheza, in particular, had also placed pressure by indicating that the funder requires a signed agreement in order to secure and retain funding for the project else it will be allocated elsewhere to other projects.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n To get the deals over the line, PetroSA turned to Mazars.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The intern<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n When the project began in September 2023, Mazars found itself stretched thin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cBased on the CVs submitted by Mazars, we observed that 70% of the work will be subcontracted to other companies. Out of the 17 staff members proposed by Mazars \u2026 only 5 are Mazars employees,\u201d the internal audit team noted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Instead, a large chunk of the work would be carried out by the law firm CLG \u2013 formerly Centurion Law Group \u2013 owned by the powerful gas lobbyist NJ Ayuk. And it\u2019s here where problems arose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One of the internal audit team\u2019s concerns was that consultants had been substituted at the last minute, without their CVs being assessed. As they note, \u201cthe quality of due diligence report may be compromised as it might have been performed by unqualified individuals with insufficient knowledge, skills and experience required.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n One example flagged by the internal audit team was that PetroSA was billed for 223 hours of work by a senior legal consultant on CLG\u2019s team, a role that required at least six years\u2019 experience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet, when the internal audit team looked into the consultant in question, they concluded that she had just two years\u2019 experience. In fact, the consultant\u2019s LinkedIn profile shows that when Mazars began working on the project she had just 10 months\u2019 experience: eight months as a legal intern and two as a junior legal advisor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We asked both Mazars and CLG to explain how someone freshly promoted from an internship had been billed out of as a senior legal consultant at R2 000\/hour.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mazars initially side-stepped the question, telling us: \u201cThe individual was not involved in delivering the due diligence report \u2026 [She] was involved in legal work separate from the due diligence report.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n This, we pointed out, didn\u2019t make it okay. Asked whether the rest of the details were nonetheless accurate, Kokera told us: \u201cThis relates to a subcontractor. The rate allocated to [the consultant in question] is currently being resolved with PetroSA.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The preliminary due diligence<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n A \u201cDesktop Preliminary Investor Due Diligence\u201d was presented to PetroSA\u2019s Investment and Procurement Committee (IPC) on 22 September 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This was a critical meeting, but the preliminary report was mostly made up of marketing material sourced from Mulaudzi and his partners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The slides, which carry the Mazars logo and those of its partners, regurgitate a range of uncritical claims, including that EquaTheza\u2019s \u201chydrocarbon experience put them in an advantageous position to reduce carbon emissions. Their values are underpinned by their knowledge and capabilities and driven by good corporate governance.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n EquaTheza was, in reality, a dormant special purpose vehicle that had been registered just two months earlier.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Under key personnel, Mulaudzi\u2019s brief stint in 2003 as the Chief Technology Knowledge Officer for the Presidential National Commission was mentioned; the 2019 Mpati Commission\u2019s investigation into alleged corruption and malfeasance in his multi-billion-rand PIC-funded deals was not. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The presentation carried more weight than normal: as a sub-committee of the board, the IPC would normally be only one step in the chain of command. Under PetroSA\u2019s dictatorial chair Nkhululeko Poya, however, the PetroSA CEO\u2019s delegation of authority had been capped at R50 000 and executive decision-making had instead been vested in the three-member IPC, chaired by Poya himself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When we asked Mazars about its presentation, Kokera confirmed that a team had attended the meeting but flat-out denied that any due diligence had been presented: \u201cThis is not accurate. No representative from Forvis Mazars presented our due diligence findings at an IPC workshop on 22 September 2023.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mazars, he added, only began its due diligence on EquaTheza five days later, on 27 September. <\/p>\n\n\n\n As for the 15 slides bearings Mazars\u2019 logo, and described as a \u201cDesktop Preliminary Investor Due Diligence,\u201d Kokera declined to answer any further questions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The final due diligence<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The official due diligence report delivered two weeks later was more comprehensive: the work, Mazars told us, \u201cwas completed by forensic experts with over 20 years of fraud investigation experience\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But the end result was similar: Mulaudzi and his partners were \u201clow risk\u201d and the kind of people PetroSA could do business with.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This time around the due diligence flagged \u201cnegative press\u201d about the colourful Limpopo businessman: \u201cWe identified negative press\/media relating to alleged corruption by [Mr Mulaudzi\u2019s] company Blackgold Oil and Gas. It is alleged that [Mr Mulaudzi] and his company Blackgold Oil and Gas made payments to a transfer attorney in favour of Former Health Minister Mr Zweli Mkhize\u2019s company (ZLM Trust).\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n In fact, Mulaudzi had allegedly been paying other politicians as well, including then deputy president of the EFF Floyd Shivambu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2017, Shivambu had sent Mulaudzi a series of WhatsApp messages telling him that there was \u201ca great need for urgent intervention\u201d and providing the bank account details for Grand Azania, the company fronted by Shivambu\u2019s brother Brian. Between 2016 and 2017, Mulaudzi paid R500 000 into Grand Azania\u2019s bank account, according to Daily Maverick.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mulaudzi had also bankrolled a beauty salon owner at the behest of then-PIC chief executive Dan Matjila, around the time that Mulaudzi was securing multi-billion-rand loans from the PIC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mulaudzi later told the Mpati Commission that he had no hesitation about paying the R300 000 to the young woman who had Matjila\u2019s ear: \u201cAt no point did I regard this as a loan. This was based on the request made by Dr Matjila \u2026 it was only natural for me to comply with his request, as I have been funded by the PIC in my business ventures.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Commission had even uncovered a \u201chighly irregular relationship\u201d between Mulaudzi and the PIC\u2019s transaction advisor from Nedbank, who had received an undisclosed R400 000 loan from Mulaudzi, paid into his wife\u2019s bank account.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2019, UDM leader Bantu Holomisa told the Mpati Commission: \u201cWe think it would be wise to inquire \u2026 why it seems so easy for Mr Mulaudzi to gain access to PIC funding.\u201d Referring to one of the messages, he said it \u201cseems to reinforce \u2026 the idea that Lawrence Mulaudzi had a hotline with the PIC management\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet when Mazars queried this episode, Equator\u2019s finance director Lot Magosha told them: \u201cMr Mulaudzi volunteered to spearhead the process of appearing before Mpati Commission of the PIC and provided credible evidence which helped the Commission to come to a conclusion to exonerate any unfounded allegations against the transaction.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n In fact, the Commission had recommended a forensic audit and, potentially, legal action to reclaim funds paid out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is unclear why Mazars accepted these claims at face value, particularly from Magosha, who had himself had been implicated in corrupt dealings at the PIC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2018, advocate Terry Motau\u2019s report on the collapse of VBS Mutual Bank identified two front companies that PIC executive Paul Magula used as fronts to receive apparent kickbacks from VBS and other PIC-funded deals: Investar and Hekima. Magosha had been the sole director of both.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Although the Mpati Commission failed to make the connection, Investar had been gifted shares in both of Mulaudzi\u2019s PIC-funded deals worth roughly R24-million.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When we confronted Mulaudzi about this in 2019, he claimed he had been in the dark. \u201c[W]e held a special board meeting to address this matter and it was resolved that [the company] enters into a mutual separation agreement with Mr Magosha.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Five years later though, Magosha was still very much in the picture as Equator\u2019s financial director.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Asked why it had failed to raise a red flag about Magosha, Mazars told us: \u201cMr Magosha was not listed as a director on CIPC, and therefore checks on Mr Magosha were outside the scope of our assignment.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Instead, Mazars said its due diligence was limited to conducting a security clearance and reviewing EquaTheza\u2019s legal status and B-BBEE compliance. This, however, included looking into criminal records, conflicts of interest, the presence of politically exposed persons, directors and shareholders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Even within this limited scope, however, Mazars had fallen short. Theza Oil & Gas, which owned 70% of EquaTheza, didn\u2019t provide a share register to Mazars, saying that the shares were in the process of being transferred to various trusts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The original shareholders had been local businessman Barend Hendricks (51%), and two Russian business partners: engineer Albert Iskhakov (25%) and Sergey Okhotnikov (24%), the former chair of a Russian state company.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe transfer of the above shareholders into a trust may result in the ultimate shareholders and\/or beneficiaries being unknown,\u201d Mazars had noted, without stressing that the ultimate beneficiaries of the EquaTheza deal now appeared to be Mulaudzi and three unidentified trusts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mazars didn\u2019t want to respond to our questions on this point but stressed that its due diligence was not a blanket endorsement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Its assessment that Mulaudzi and his partners were \u201clow risk\u201d was supplemented by drawing PetroSA\u2019s attention to the alleged payments to Mkhize\u2019s trust and the fact that Mulaudzi\u2019s brother, Thilivhali Mulaudzi, who was a director of Equator, was under debt review.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But whether PetroSA even noticed these caveats is unclear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cMazars, as our Transaction Advisors, through a due diligence identified \u2026 Equatheza and Equator as low risk and as a result did not foresee any reason not to proceed with the partnership transactions,\u201d a member of PetroSA\u2019s management team later told Internal Audit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The final due diligence was delivered to PetroSA on 10 October 2023; the following day PetroSA signed a profit-sharing agreement with EquaTheza.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Inadequate due diligence<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The $12-million EquaTheza had promised never materialised and in June 2024, PetroSA pulled the plug on the deal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For months, EquaTheza had been arguing that it could not pay the $12-million until an agreement on how the FA platform would be operated had been signed. PetroSA\u2019s view was that the profit-sharing agreement simply said \u201cpay\u201d and EquaTheza hadn\u2019t paid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Internally, questions about how EquaTheza had been appointed in the first place began to emerge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In fact, the preliminary desktop due diligence \u2013 the September 2023 slides that Mazars has attempted to disown \u2013 had identified that there was a risk that EquaTheza would not be \u201csufficiently resourced to execute the [work programmes] (refers to both technical ability and the ability to secure debt funding)\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To mitigate the risk, the plan had been to conduct a due diligence on the \u201ccommercial and technical competency of EquaTheza\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet the \u201cfinal due diligence\u201d report \u2013 delivered in October 2023 \u2013 made no mention of EquaTheza\u2019s financial capabilities. The report had briefly mentioned that Equator\u2019s last set of financial statements was three years old and that Theza was \u201ca [special purpose vehicle] that has not traded before,\u201d but no conclusions were drawn from that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe due diligence is silent on the capability of the partners to technical[ly] and financial[ly] execute the work programs which we believe are critical indicators of the service provider\u2019s capability,\u201d the internal audit team noted in its draft report.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Barend Hendricks, the chair of EquaTheza, told us that Mazars had, in fact, asked questions about their funding, which was initially going to come from Russia\u2019s Eximbank.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cEquatheza has submitted proof of funding on various occasions. When Mazars as part of their due diligence flag[ged] our potential funding source from Russia as political sensitive, we raised alternative funding,\u201d he told us over email.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This didn\u2019t make it into the report either.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cDue professional care was not exercised by Mazars,\u201d the draft internal audit report concluded. An \u201cinadequate due diligence\u201d may have led PetroSA to take \u201cuninformed decisions\u201d and \u201cget into business with unsuitable service providers\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The internal audit team reached a similar conclusion about Mazars\u2019 work on the Gazprombank due diligence. Although we haven\u2019t seen a copy of this due diligence, a second draft internal audit report concluded that it too \u201cmay be sub-standard\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cDying slowly\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Unsurprisingly, Mazars rejects the criticism of its work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In part, Mazars assumed that PetroSA had already assessed the bidders\u2019 financial viability when it evaluated the bids. \u201c[A]s part of the evaluation criteria, the bidders would have had to provide documentation indicating \u2018sufficient funding to support proposal\u2019 \u2026 Therefore PetroSA would have considered their partners\u2019 capacity to sufficiently fund the project before our appointment,\u201d Kokera told us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He added that the \u201cfinal due diligence\u201d report, delivered in October 2023, was only the first step in the due diligence process and that a more detailed financial due diligence would have been done when PetroSA was ready to make a final investment decision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThere appears to be a misunderstanding between the initial due diligence we conducted and the in-depth financial due diligence scheduled for a subsequent stage to support a final investment decision,\u201d he told us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In other words, the \u201cpreliminary\u201d due diligence should be ignored, the \u201cfinal\u201d one should be treated as preliminary and the actual final due diligence was yet to be done.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It\u2019s worth pointing out that there is no mention of this distinction in the \u201cfinal due diligence\u201d report that was delivered to PetroSA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, when Internal Audit raised this with management \u2013 in relation to the parallel Gazprombank tender \u2013 they confirmed that the intention was for Mazars to conduct further due diligence down the line.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe risk with PetroSA [ is that] we ask for details needed at [final investment decision] \u2026 and when we don\u2019t get those answers we restart and we keep reagitating without any significant progress,\u201d Sesakho Magadla, the acting COO, told Internal Audit. \u201cIn that time the organisation is dying slowly.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The other plank of Mazars\u2019 defence is that the profit-sharing agreement gave PetroSA an exit strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cMazars played a key role in developing the conditions precedent in the profit-sharing agreement and advised PetroSA regarding termination when these conditions were not met,\u201d Kokera told us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The profit-sharing agreement, he added, gave PetroSA \u201clegally permissible exit clauses if the partners did not deliver\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Reading between the lines, it appeared to us that Mazars wasn\u2019t about to tell PetroSA that the partner it so desperately wanted was lit up like a fire truck with alarm bells, and instead added an escape route for when cooler heads prevailed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We asked Kokera if he and his team had felt pressured to approve PetroSA\u2019s chosen partners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWe conducted ourselves professionally and acted without undue influence from the client or elsewhere,\u201d he told us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The problem is that not everyone agrees that the conditions precedent gave PetroSA a foolproof exit strategy. EquaTheza \u2013 which dropped Mulaudzi as a partner in January \u2013 has threatened to sue PetroSA over its decision to cancel its contract.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cShould it become apparent that PetroSA intends to persist in its contrived termination of the [agreement], our instruction are \u2026 to institute review proceedings to set aside the unlawful decision taken by PetroSA,\u201d its lawyer told PetroSA in June.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cEquatheza has worked for over 8 years on this project,\u201d Hendricks told us last week.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cEquatheza can confirm that it is ready, able and willing to commence the work and will exercise it rights as per the profit share agreement to the benefit of PetroSA and the country at large.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Double dipping<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite the cursory nature of Mazars\u2019 work, the 12-member transaction advisory team still billed PetroSA for 1 898 hours of work between September and December 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This wasn\u2019t just for work on the due diligence: the legal team had drawn up the profit-sharing agreements, while others had drafted memos for the board and for Cabinet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When Internal Audit reviewed the billing, however, it noticed issues, including a partner from CLG who worked an improbable 10-hours a day for two months straight at a cost of R4 160\/hour.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cOf concern is that individuals charged out at Partner rate e.g. R4 160 per hour, generally worked longer hours compared to the assigned team. Furthermore, the individual charged out as the Legal Partner exceeded the average 40 hours per week for both September and October 2023,\u201d a second draft internal audit report noted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The partner in question, Oneyka Ojogbo, is the Deputy Managing Partner at CLG in Johannesburg. According to the draft internal audit report, PetroSA was billed for 158 hours of her time in September 2023 and 220 hours in October 2023 \u2013 the equivalent of working from 8am to 7pm every day of the week.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The internal audit team found this unlikely and instead suggested that Mazars may have been double-dipping on fees, i.e. billing PetroSA for an hour of Ojogbo\u2019s time on the Gazprombank deal and billing it again for the same hour of her work on the Equator and EquaTheza deal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the draft report, the internal audit team advised PetroSA to \u201cinitiate a process to investigate the validity of the excessive hours charged by Mazars and investigate the possibility of duplicate charges being made in terms of the same individuals working simultaneously on [the Gazprombank deal] & [the EquaTheza and Equator deals].\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mazars denies that it engaged in overbilling. \u201cWe dispute that excessive hours were billed \u2026 The project\u2019s tight timelines necessitated work on weekends, so substantial overtime was incurred. PetroSA reviewed and approved all submitted invoices, substantiated by evidence of work performed,\u201d Kokera told us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, when we asked Kokera if he was arguing that Ojogbo\u2019s 220 hours of work billed in October 2023 could be explained by overtime and work on weekends, he prevaricated: \u201cThis relates to a subcontractor. Please approach [CLG] for comment,\u201d he told us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We reached out to Ojogbo and CLG\u2019s chief executive but received no response.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Conflicted<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n There was another problem with CLG, Internal Audit noted: the controversial law firm appeared to be acting as transaction advisors to PetroSA while also acting for Mulaudzi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As legal advisors to PetroSA, CLG would play a critical role in drafting the contracts that PetroSA and Equator would eventually sign. Its lawyers were also involved in the due diligence, and its legal opinion on the sanctions risk of the Gazprombank deal was a critical green light.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet according to Internal Audit, Equator\u2019s bid listed CLG as its partner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Whether there was a partnership and whether Mazars knew, is contested.\u201cWe were unaware of any conflicts with Equator and Centurion Law Group when we completed the due diligence,\u201d Kokera told us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Early drafts of the internal audit report still include reference to a \u201cpossible conflict of interest on law firm,\u201d but it was removed in later versions after CLG told Internal Audit that it had no relationship with Equator.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the very least, the internal audit team concluded, Mazars should have queried this during the due diligence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cHad Mazars conducted the due diligence adequately on Equator\u2019s partners, it would have revealed that the claimed partnership between Equator and CLG was non-existent (as per the email from CLG). This would raise concerns about the reliability and legitimacy of the proposal information submitted by Equator,\u201d the draft report noted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pay back the money<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In October last year \u2013 after the Equator and EquaTheza deals had been cancelled, and with Gazprombank\u2019s on life support \u2013 PetroSA wrote to Mazars \u201crequesting a refund of R1 076 720 within 7 days\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is unclear how PetroSA reached this figure, but it appears to be based on consultants charging higher rates than their job titles allowed. To speed up the process, management told Internal Audit that it planned to deduct the money from Mazars\u2019 final invoice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So far, that hasn\u2019t happened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWe reviewed PetroSA\u2019s explanation of how they reached this figure and noted that it was informed by incorrect assumptions and \/ or lack of information that has since been furnished to PetroSA,\u201d Kokera told us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We pointed out that despite Mazars\u2019 explanation, negotiations were still ongoing three months later, suggesting that PetroSA was unconvinced.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cPetroSA has raised concerns, which Mazars is handling. Many of these issues have been resolved,\u201d Kokera said. Mazars, he added, \u201chas not refunded any fees nor committed to any refund. PetroSA has not deducted any amounts\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n PetroSA \u2013 as is its custom \u2013 declined to answer our questions. \u201cWe are cognisant of \u2026 the important role played by media in ensuring integrity and transparency through access to information. As PetroSA, we reserve our right not to provide any comment,\u201d Nonny Mashika-Dennison, the general manager of communications, told us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If PetroSA remain unconvinced, the potential consequences for Mazars, which took ultimate responsibility for the project, are severe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIf these hours cannot be substantiated and are not aligned with the deliverables and\/or actual hours worked, the incurred expenditure will need to be reported as fruitless and wasteful expenditure and be recovered from Mazars,\u201d the internal audit team wrote. \u201cAppropriate action should then also be instituted against the supplier that will include recovery of the money and being \u2018blacklisted\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Blacklisting by National Treasury is the most severe form of sanction a company can face. Of all the firms implicated in State Capture the only one to be blacklisted is Bain, the consulting firm that helped to gut Sars.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If Mazars is added to Treasury\u2019s list of Tender Defaulters, it would be banned from public sector work for the next 10 years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We asked Kokera whether the firm was concerned about the reputational damage the three failed deals could cause. \u201cMazars did not appoint the partners, nor did we provide a \u2018greenlight\u2019 \u2026 The scope of this due diligence was insufficient to provide a go or no-go decision,\u201d he told us, adding: \u201cWe are confident of the process we followed and the quality of advice provided at every stage of the project.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Mazars\u2019 due diligence helped to green light three scandal-plagued deals between PetroSA, Russia\u2019s Gazprombank Africa and notorious wheeler dealer Lawrence Mulaudzi.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":33347,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2,1283],"tags":[1232],"class_list":["post-33346","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-stories","category-whatever","tag-main"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/further.co.za\/amabwp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/33346","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/further.co.za\/amabwp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/further.co.za\/amabwp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/further.co.za\/amabwp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/6"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/further.co.za\/amabwp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=33346"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/further.co.za\/amabwp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/33346\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":33350,"href":"https:\/\/further.co.za\/amabwp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/33346\/revisions\/33350"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/further.co.za\/amabwp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/33347"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/further.co.za\/amabwp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=33346"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/further.co.za\/amabwp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=33346"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/further.co.za\/amabwp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=33346"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}\n
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